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Guaranteeing Positive Secrecy Capacity with
Finite-Rate Feedback using Artificial Noise
Shuiyin Liu, Yi Hong, and Emanuele Viterbo
Abstract—While the impact of finite-rate feedback on the
capacity of fading channels has been extensively studied in the
literature, not much attention has been paid to this problem
under secrecy constraint. In this work, we study the ergodic secret
capacity of a multiple-input multiple-output multiple-antenna-
eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channel with quantized chan-
nel state information (CSI) at the transmitter and perfect CSI
at the legitimate receiver, under the assumption that only the
statistics of eavesdropper CSI is known at the transmitter. We
refine the analysis of the random vector quantization (RVQ) based
artificial noise (AN) scheme in [1], where a heuristic upper bound
on the secrecy rate loss, when compared to the perfect CSI
case, was given. We propose a lower bound on the ergodic
secrecy capacity. We show that the lower bound and the secrecy
capacity with perfect CSI coincide asymptotically as the number
of feedback bits and the AN power go to infinity. For practical
applications, we propose a very efficient quantization codebook
construction method for the two transmit antennas case.
Index Terms—artificial noise, secret capacity, physical layer
security, wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Complexity-based cryptographic technologies (e.g. AES
[2]) have traditionally been used to provide a secure gateway
for communications and data exchanges at the network layer.
The security is achieved if an eavesdropper (Eve) without
the key cannot decipher the message in a reasonable amount
of time. This premise becomes controversial with the rapid
developments of computing devices (e.g. quantum computer).
In contrast, physical layer security (PLS) does not depend on
a specific computational model and can provide security even
when Eve has unlimited computing power. Wyner [3] and later
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4] proposed the wiretap channel model
as a basic framework for PLS. Wyner has shown that for
discrete memoryless channels, if Eve intercepts a degraded
version of the intended receiver’s (Bob’s) signal, a prescribed
degree of data confidentiality could be simultaneously attained
by channel coding without any secret key. The associated
notion of secrecy capacity was introduced to characterize the
maximum transmission rate from the transmitter (Alice) to
Bob, below which Eve is unable to obtain any information.
Wyner’s wiretap channel model has been extended to fad-
ing channel [5], Gaussian broadcast channel [6], multiple-
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input single-output multiple-antenna-eavesdropper (MISOME)
channel [7], and multiple-input multiple-output multiple-
antenna-eavesdropper (MIMOME) channel [8]. All these
works rely on the perfect knowledge of Bob’s channel state
information (CSI) at Alice to compute the secrecy capacity
and enable secure encoding. In particular, Eve’s CSI is also
assumed to be known at Alice in [5], [6], [8], although the CSI
of a passive Eve is very hard to be unveiled at Alice. It is more
reasonable to assume that Alice only knows the statistics of
Eve’s channel. Even the assumption of perfect knowing Bob’s
CSI is not realistic. In practice, Bob can only provide Alice
with a quantized version of his CSI via a rate constrained
feedback channel (i.e., finite-rate feedback).
In this work, we are interested in the secrecy capacity condi-
tioned on the quantized CSI of Bob’s channel and the statistics
of Eve’s channel. While the impact of finite-rate feedback on
the capacity of fading channels has been extensively studied
(see [9]–[13]), not much attention has been given to this
problem under secrecy constraint. In [14], assuming that Alice
only knows the statistics of Eve’s channel, the authors derived
lower and upper bounds on the ergodic secrecy capacity
for a single-input single-output single-antenna-eavesdropper
(SISOSE) system with finite-rate feedback of Bob’s CSI. In the
MIMOME scenario, the artificial noise (AN) scheme has been
shown to guarantee positive secrecy capacity without knowing
Eve’s CSI in [15]. Alice is assumed to have perfect knowledge
of Bob’s eigenchannel vectors. This assumption allows her to
align artificial noise within the null space of a MIMO channel
between Alice and Bob, so that only Eve’s equivocation is
enhanced. In [1], the authors show that if only quantized CSI
is available at Alice, the artificial noise will leak into Bob’s
channel, causing a decrease in the achievable secrecy rate. A
heuristic upper bound on the secrecy rate loss (compared to
the perfect CSI case) is proposed in [1, Eq. 34].
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a lower
bound on the ergodic secrecy capacity for the AN scheme
with quantized CSI, valid for any number of Alice/Bob/Eve
antennas, as well as for any Bob/Eve SNR regimes. Following
the work in [1], we use the random vector quantization (RVQ)
scheme in [9]. Namely, given B feedback bits, Bob quantizes
his eigenchannel matrix to one of N = 2B random unitary
matrices and feeds back the corresponding index. We first
show that RVQ is asymptotically optimal for security purpose,
i.e., the secrecy capacity/rate loss compared to the perfect CSI
case converges to 0 as B → ∞. This result implies that the
heuristic bound in [1, Eq. 34] is not tight, since it reduces to
a positive constant as B → ∞. To refine the analysis in [1],
2we establish a tighter upper bound on the secrecy rate loss,
which leads to an explicit lower bound on the ergodic secrecy
capacity. We further show that the lower bound and the secrecy
capacity with perfect CSI coincide asymptotically as B and the
AN power go to infinity. This allows us to provide a sufficient
condition guaranteeing positive secrecy capacity.
From a practical point of view, it is often desirable to use
a deterministic quantization codebook rather than a random
one. The problem of derandomizing RVQ codebooks is related
to discretizing the complex Grassmannian manifold [9], [10].
Since the optimal constructions are possible only in very
special cases, deterministic codebooks are mostly generated
by computer search [16]. Interestingly, the case of codebook
design with two transmit antennas is equivalent to quantizing
a real sphere [13]. According to this fact, we propose a
very efficient codebook construction method for the two-
antenna case. Simulation results demonstrate that near-RVQ
performance is achieved by a moderate number of feedback
bits.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the
system model, followed by the analysis of secrecy capacity
with finite-rate feedback in Section III. Section IV provides
the deterministic quantization codebook construction method
for the two-antenna case. Conclusions are drawn in Section V.
Proofs of the theorems are given in Appendix.
Notation: Matrices and column vectors are denoted by upper
and lowercase boldface letters, and the Hermitian transpose,
inverse, pseudoinverse of a matrix B by BH , B−1, and B†,
respectively. |B| denotes the determinant of B. Let the random
variables {Xn} and X be defined on the same probability
space. We write Xn a.s.→ X if Xn converges to X almost surely
or with probability one. In denotes the identity matrix of size
n. An m × n null matrix is denoted by 0m×n. A circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random variable x with variance
σ2 is defined as x ∽ NC(0, σ2). The real, complex, integer and
complex integer numbers are denoted by R, C, Z and Z [i],
respectively. I(x; y) represents the mutual information of two
random variables x and y. We use the standard asymptotic
notation f (x) = O (g (x)) when lim sup
x→∞
|f(x)/g(x)| < ∞.
⌈x⌋ rounds to the closest integer, while ⌊x⌋ to the closest
integer smaller than or equal to x and ⌈x⌉ to the closest integer
larger than or equal to x. A central complex Wishart matrix
A ∈ Cm×m with n degrees of freedom and covariance matrix
Σ, is defined as A ∽ Wm(n,Σ). Trace of a square matrix B
is denoted by Tr (B). We write , for equality in definition.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider secure communications over a three-terminal
system, including a transmitter (Alice), the intended receiver
(Bob), and an unauthorized receiver (Eve), equipped with NA,
NB, and NE antennas, respectively. The signal vectors received
by Bob and Eve are
z = Hx+ nB, (1)
y = Gx + nE, (2)
where x ∈ CNA is the transmit signal vector, H ∈ CNB×NA
and G ∈ CNE×NA are the respective channel matrices between
Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve, and nB, nE are AWGN vectors
with i.i.d. entries ∼ NC(0, σ2B) and NC(0, σ2E). We assume that
the entries of H and G are i.i.d. complex random variables
∼ NC(0, 1).
Without loss of generality, we normalize Bob’s channel
noise variance to one, i.e.,
σ2B = 1. (3)
In this paper, we assume that Bob knows its own channel
matrix H instantaneously and Eve knows both its own channel
matrix G and the main channel H, instantaneously; whereas
Alice is only aware of the statistics of H and G. There is also
an error-free public feedback channel with limited capacity
from Bob to Alice that can be tracked by Eve. In our setting,
the feedback is exclusively used to send the index of the
codeword in a quantization codebook that describes the main
channel state information H. The quantization codebook is
assumed to be known a priori to Alice, Bob and Eve.
A. Artificial Noise Scheme with Perfect CSI
The original AN scheme assumes NB < NA, in order
to ensure that H has a non-trivial null space with an or-
thonormal basis Z = null(H) ∈ CNA×(NA−NB) (such that
HZ = 0NB×(NA−NB)) [15]. Let H = UΛVH be the singular
value decomposition (SVD) of H, where U ∈ CNB×NB and
V ∈ CNA×NA are unitary matrices. Then, we can write the
unitary matrix V as
V = [V˜,Z], (4)
where the NB columns of V˜ ∈ CNA×NB span the orthogo-
nal complement subspace to the null space spanned by the
columns of Z ∈ CNA×(NA−NB).
With unlimited feedback (i.e., perfect CSI), Alice has per-
fect knowledge of the precoding matrix V, and transmits
x = V˜u+ Zv = V
[
u
v
]
, (5)
where u ∈ CNB is the information vector and v ∈ C(NA−NB) is
the “artificial noise”. For the purpose of evaluating the achiev-
able secrecy rate, both u and v are assumed to be circular
symmetric Gaussian random vectors with i.i.d. complex entries
∼ NC(0, σ
2
u) and NC(0, σ2v), respectively. In [17], we have
shown that Gaussian input alphabets asymptotically achieves
the secrecy capacity as σ2v →∞.
Equations (1) and (2) can then be rewritten as
z = HV˜u+HZv + nB = HV˜u+ nB, (6)
y = GV˜u+GZv + nE, (7)
to show that with unlimited feedback, the artificial noise only
degrades Eve’s channel, resulting in increased secrecy capacity
(compared to the non-AN case).
B. Artificial Noise Scheme with Quantized CSI
In [1], the authors analyzed the impact of finite-rate feed-
back on the secrecy rate achievable by the AN scheme. To
quantize the matrix V˜ in (4), the random vector quantization
3(RVQ) scheme in [9] is used. Given B feedback bits per
fading channel, Bob specifies V˜ from a random quantization
codebook
V =
{
V˜i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2
B
}
, (8)
where the entries are independent NA × NB random unitary
matrices, i.e., V˜Hi V˜i = INB . The codebook V is known a
priori to both Alice, Bob and Eve. Bob selects the V˜j that
minimize the chordal distance between V˜i and V˜ [11]:
V˜j = min
V˜i∈V
d2
(
V˜i,V˜
)
, (9)
where
d
(
V˜i,V˜
)
= NB − Tr
(
V˜
H
V˜iV˜
H
i V˜
)
. (10)
Note that Tr (A) denotes the trace of the square matrix A. And
then, Bob relays the corresponding index j back to Alice.
Alice generates the precoding matrix from V˜j as follows.
Let v˜1, ... , v˜NB be the columns of V˜j , and e1, ... , eNA−NB
be the standard basis vectors. Alice applies the Gram-Schmidt
algorithm to the matrix
[v˜1, ... , v˜NB , e1, ... , eNA−NB ]
to generate the remaining orthonormal basis vectors spanning
the orthogonal complement space to the one generated by the
columns of V˜j . This provides Alice with a unitary matrix
Vˆ = [V˜j , Zˆ] ∈ C
NA×NA
, (11)
that can be used to precode u and v as in (5).
Since Zˆ 6= Z, the interference term HZˆv cannot be nulled
at Bob. Therefore, equations (6) and (7) reduce to
z = HV˜ju+HZˆv + nB, (12)
y = GV˜ju+GZˆv + nE, (13)
and show that with finite rate feedback (i.e., quantized CSI),
some of the artificial noise will inevitably leak into the main
channel from Alice to Bob, causing degradation in the secrecy
capacity (compared to the unlimited feedback case).
C. Assumptions and Notations
The analysis in [1], [15] are based on the assumption of
NE < NA. Clearly, this assumption is not always realistic. In
this work, we remove this assumption and evaluate the secrecy
capacity for any number of Eve antennas.
Since Vˆ in (11) is a unitary matrix, the total transmission
power can be written as
||x||2 =
[
u
v
]H
Vˆ
H
Vˆ
[
u
v
]
= ||u||2 + ||v||2. (14)
Then the average transmit power constraint P is
P = E(||x||2) = Pu + Pv, (15)
where
Pu = E(||u||2) = σ2uNB,
Pv = E(||v||2) = σ2v(NA −NB),
(16)
are fixed by the power allocation scheme that selects the power
balance between σ2u and σ2v .
We define Bob’s and Eve’s SNRs as
• SNRB , σ2u/σ2B
• SNRE , σ2u/σ2E
To simplify our notation, we define three system parameters:
• α , σ2u/σ
2
E = SNRE
• β , σ2v/σ
2
u (AN power allocation)
• γ , σ2E/σ
2
B (Eve-to-Bob noise-power ratio)
Note that SNRB = αγ. If γ > 1, we say Eve has a degraded
channel. Since we have normalized σ2B to one, we can rewrite
(16) as
• Pu = αγNB
• Pv = αβγ(NA −NB)
D. Instantaneous and Ergodic Secrecy Capacities
We recall from [8] the definition of instantaneous secrecy
capacity for MIMOME channel:
CS , max
p(u)
{I(u; z)−I(u;y)} . (17)
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distri-
butions p (u). We remark that CS is a function of H and G,
which are embedded in z and y. To average out the channel
randomness, we further define the ergodic secrecy capacity, as
in [15]
E(CS) , max
p(u)
{I(u;z|H)−I(u;y|H, G)} , (18)
where I (X;Y |Z) , EZ [I (X;Y ) |Z], following the notation in
[18].
Since closed form expressions for CS and E(CS) are not
always available, we often consider the corresponding secrecy
rates, given by
RS , I(u;z)−I(u;y), (19)
E(RS) , I(u;z|H)−I(u;y|H,G), (20)
assuming Gaussian input alphabets, i.e., v and u are mutually
independent Gaussian vectors with i.i.d. complex entries NC(0,
σ2v) and NC(0, σ2u), respectively.
From (6), (7) and (19), the achievable secrecy rate with
perfect CSI can be written as
RS = log
∣∣∣INB + αγHHH ∣∣∣+ log ∣∣∣INE + αβ(GZ)(GZ)H ∣∣∣
− log
∣∣∣INE + α(GV˜)(GV˜)H + αβ(GZ)(GZ)H ∣∣∣ . (21)
The closed-form expression of E(RS) can be found in [17, Th.
1]. It is shown that E(RS)→ E(CS) as the AN power Pv →∞
in [17, Th. 3].
From (12), (13) and (19), the achievable secrecy rate with
quantized CSI can be written as
RS,Q = log
∣∣∣INB + αγ(HV˜j)(HV˜j)H + αβγ(HZˆ)(HZˆ)H ∣∣∣∣∣∣INB + αβγ(HZˆ)(HZˆ)H ∣∣∣
− log
∣∣∣INE + α(GV1,j)(GV˜j)H + αβ(GZˆ)(GZˆ)H ∣∣∣∣∣∣INE + αβ(GZˆ)(GZˆ)H ∣∣∣ .
(22)
4E. Open Problems and Motivations
Using [19, Eq. 2, pp. 56], it is simple to show that
E(RS) ≥ E(RS,Q). (23)
In [1], the ergodic secrecy rate loss is defined by:
E(∆RS) , E(RS)− E(RS,Q). (24)
A heuristic upper bound was proposed in [1, Eq. 34]:
E(∆RS) / NB log

NB + αβγNAD
(
NA, NB, 2
B
)
NB −D
(
NA, NB, 2B
)


+NB log
(
1 +
1
αγ (NA −NB)
)
, UBheuristic. (25)
where
D
(
NA, NB, 2
B
)
= E
(
d2
(
V˜j ,V˜
))
, (26)
and d (·, ·) is give in (10).
However, (25) is insufficient to characterize the impact
of quantized CSI on the secrecy rate achievable by the AN
scheme. To see this, we first provide the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For the RVQ-based AN scheme, as B →∞,
Vˆ → V, (27)
where V is given in (4) and Vˆ is given in (11).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 shows the RVQ scheme is asymptotically opti-
mal for large B, i.e., the secrecy capacity/rate loss (compared
to the perfect CSI case) converges to zero. In contrast, as
B →∞, UBheuristic in (25) reduces to a positive constant:
UBheuristic → NB log
(
1 +
1
αγ (NA −NB)
)
, (28)
since D
(
NA, NB, 2
B
)
→ 0 as B → ∞ [11]. Hence, the
heuristic bound in (25) is not tight.
Remark 1: The ergodic secrecy capacity with quantized
CSI, denoted by E(CS,Q), is lower bounded by
E(CS,Q) ≥ E(RS,Q) = E(RS)− E(∆RS). (29)
Using the closed-form expression of E(RS) given in [17, Th.
1], we are motivated to establish a tighter upper bound on
E(∆RS), which allows us to obtain a lower bound on E(CS,Q).
III. SECRECY CAPACITY WITH QUANTIZED CSI
In this section, we wish to determine the secrecy capacity
with RVQ scheme. A tight upper bound on the ergodic secrecy
rate loss and a lower bound on the ergodic secrecy capacity
are provided in Theorem 2 and Theorem 4, respectively. In
Theorem 5, we show that the lower bound and the secrecy
capacity with perfect/quantized CSI coincide asymptotically
as B and Pv go to infinity. This provides a sufficient condition
guaranteeing positive secrecy capacity.
To describe our result, we first recall the following function
from [20]:
Θ(m,n, x) , e−1/x
m−1∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
2l∑
i=0
{
(−1)i(2l)!(n−m+ i)!
22k−il!i!(n −m+ l)!
·
(
2(k − l)
k − l
)
·
(
2(l + n−m)
2l − i
)
·
n−m+i∑
j=0
x−jΓ(−j, 1/x)
}
,
(30)
where
(a
b
)
= a!/((a− b)!b!) is the binomial coefficient, n ≥ m
are positive integers, and Γ(a, b) is the incomplete Gamma
function
Γ(a, b) =
∫ ∞
b
xa−1e−xdx. (31)
We further define
Nmin , min {NE, NA −NB} , (32)
Nmax , max {NE, NA −NB} , (33)
Nˆmin , min {NE, NA} , (34)
Nˆmax , max {NE, NA} . (35)
Finally, we define a set of NA power ratios {θi}NA1 , where
θi ,
{
α 1 ≤ i ≤ NB
αβ NB + 1 ≤ i ≤ NA
(36)
We recall from [11, Th. 4] that
µ
(
NA, NB, 2
B
)
≤ D
(
NA, NB, 2
B
)
≤ η
(
NA, NB, 2
B
)
, (37)
where D (·, ·, ·) is given in (26) and
η (n, p,K) =
Γ
(
1
p(n− p)
)
p(n− p)
(Kc (n, p))
−
1
p(n− p)
+p exp(− (Kc (n, p))1−ζ), (38)
µ (n, p,K) =
p(n− p)
p(n− p) + 1
(Kc (n, p))
−
1
p(n− p)
,
(39)
c (n, p) =


1
Γ(p(n− p) + 1)
p∏
i=1
Γ(n− i+ 1)
Γ(p− i+ 1)
, n ≥ 2p
1
Γ(p(n− p) + 1)
n−p∏
i=1
Γ(n− i+ 1)
Γ(n− p− i+ 1)
, n ≤ 2p
(40)
for any 0 < ζ < 1. Note that Γ(a) is the Gamma function.
A. Bounds on Ergodic/Instantaneous Secrecy Rate Loss
We first consider the ergodic secrecy rate loss E(∆RS).
Theorem 2: Let θmin = min {αγ, αβγ}. We have
E(∆RS) ≤ Θ(NB, NA, αγ)−Θ(NB, NA, θmin)
+ Θ

NB, NA, αβγ η
(
NA, NB, 2
B
)
NB

 , UB, (41)
where Θ(·, ·, ·) is given in (30) and η(·, ·, ·) is given in (38).
Proof: See Appendix B.
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Fig. 1. E(∆RS) vs. B with β = 1, αγ = 1, NA = 4 and NB = 2.
Theorem 2 gives a tight upper bound on E(∆RS), for any
number of Alice/Bob/Eve antennas, as well as for any Bob/Eve
SNR regimes. Different from (28), if β ≥ 1, as B →∞,
UB → 0, (42)
which is consistent with Theorem 1.
Example 1: Let us apply Theorem 2 to the analysis of a
RVQ-based AN scheme with β = 1, αγ = 1, NA = 4 and
NB = 2. The numerical result in Fig. 1 shows that the proposed
upper bound in (41) is much tighter than the heuristic one in
(25), and captures the behavior of E(∆RS).
We then study the distribution of instantaneous secrecy rate
loss, defined by
∆RS , RS −RS,Q. (43)
Here, we consider the large system limit as NA and B → ∞
with fixed ratio B/NA. An interesting case that leads to a
closed-form bound can be found when NB = NE = 1.
Theorem 3: If NB = NE = 1, as NA and B → ∞ with
B/NA → B¯,
∆RS
a.s.
→ log (1 + P/β) + log
(
1 + 2−B¯P
)
− log
(
1 + P +
1− β
β
(1− 2−B¯)P
)
. (44)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 3 provides a closed-form asymptotic expression
for ∆RS when NB = NE = 1. Hence, the ergodic secrecy
rate loss also converges to the same constant, as stated in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1: Under the same assumptions of Theorem 3,
E(∆RS)→ log (1 + P/β) + log
(
1 + 2−B¯P
)
− log
(
1 + P +
1− β
β
(1− 2−B¯)P
)
. (45)
Proof: The proof is straightforward.
Example 2: The numerical result in Fig. 2 shows that (45)
is very accurate even for finite NA and B.
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Fig. 2. E(∆RS) vs. B with β = 1, P = 1, NA = 10 and NB = 1.
B. A Lower Bound on Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
A lower bound on E(CS,Q) can be derived using the results
from (29), Theorem 2 and [17, Th. 1].
Theorem 4:
E(CS,Q) ≥ Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ)−Ω +Θ(NB, NA, θmin)
−Θ

NB, NA, αβγ η
(
NA, NB, 2
B
)
NB

 , C¯LB,Q, (46)
where Θ(·, ·, ·) is given in (30), η(·, ·, ·) is given in (38) and
Ω =

 K
Nˆmin∑
k=1
det
(
R(k)
)
, β 6= 1
Θ(Nˆmin, Nˆmax, α), β = 1
(47)
K =
(−1)NE(NA−Nˆmin)
Γ
Nˆmin
(NE)
2∏
i=1
µmiNEi
2∏
i=1
Γmi(mi)
∏
i<j
(
µi − µj
)mimj , (48)
Γk(n) =
k∏
i=1
(n− i)!,
and µ1 > µ2 are the two distinct eigenvalues of the matrix
diag
({
θ−1i
}NA
1
)
, with corresponding multiplicities m1 and
m2 such that m1 +m2 = NA. The matrix R(k) has elements
r
(k)
i,j =


(µei)
NA−j−di (NA − j)!
(NA − j − di)!
, Nˆmin + 1 ≤ j ≤ NA
(−1)di
ϕ(i, j)!
(µei)
ϕ(i, j) + 1
, 1 ≤ j ≤ Nˆmin, j 6= k
(−1)diϕ(i, j)!e
µei
ϕ(i, j)∑
l=0
Γ(l − ϕ(i, j), µei)
(µei)
l + 1
, otherwise
(49)
where
ei =
{
1 1 ≤ i ≤ m1
2 m1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ NA
di =
ei∑
k=1
mk − i,
650 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3
Pv
C¯
L
B
,Q
n
a
t
 
 
C¯Bob
C¯LB,Q: B = 70
C¯LB,Q: B = 50
Fig. 3. C¯LB,Q vs. Pv with NA = 4, NB = NE = 2, and α = γ = 1.
ϕ(i, j) = NE − Nˆmin + j − 1 + di.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Theorem 4 gives a lower bound on E(CS,Q), for any number
of Alice/Bob/Eve antennas, as well as for any Bob/Eve SNR
regimes. The lower bound in (46) is an increasing function of
the number of feedback bits B. To guarantee a positive secrecy
capacity, Alice just needs to increase B and checks whether
C¯LB,Q > 0.
C. Positive Secrecy Capacity with Quantized CSI
To characterize the achievability of positive secrecy capacity
with quantized CSI, we start by analyzing the tightness of (46).
Theorem 5: If NE ≤ NA −NB and β ≥ 1, as αβ, B →∞,
C¯LB,Q = E(CS,Q) = E(CS) = C¯Bob, (50)
where C¯Bob represents Bob’s ergodic channel capacity.
Proof: See Appendix E.
We have shown that C¯LB,Q, E(CS) and C¯Bob coincide asymp-
totically as B and Pv = αβγ(NA − NB) go to infinity. We
remark that according to (18), a universal upper bound on the
ergodic secrecy capacity is given by
E(CS) ≤ max
p(u)
{I(u;z|H)} = C¯Bob. (51)
Remark 2: Note that C¯Bob > 0 and C¯LB,Q is derived based
on Gaussian input alphabets. From Theorem 5, we state
that a positive secrecy capacity for MIMOME channel with
quantized CSI is always achieved by using RVQ-based AN
transmission scheme and Gaussian input alphabets for large
B and Pv, if NE ≤ NA −NB.
Example 3: Fig. 3 compares C¯LB,Q and C¯Bob as a function
of AN power Pv, with NA = 4, NB = NE = 2, and α = γ = 1.
Since Pu = αγNB and Pv = αβγ(NA−NB), we have Pu = 2 and
Pv = 2β. The simulation result shows that C¯LB,Q approaches
to C¯Bob as Pv increases, for sufficiently large B.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION USING A DETERMINISTIC
CODEBOOK
In the previous section, random quantization codebooks
have been used to prove new results on secrecy capacity with
quantized CSI. The methods of constructing random unitary
matrices V˜i in (8) can be found in [21]. In practice, it is
often desirable that the quantization codebook is deterministic.
The problem of derandomizing RVQ codebooks is typically
referred to as Grassmannian subspace packing [9], [10].
Despite of a few special cases (e.g., B ≤ 4 [13]), analytical
codebook design in general remains an intricate task. In this
section, we propose a very efficient quantization codebook
construction method for the case of NA = 2 and NB = 1.
According to [13, Eq. (20)], the codeword V˜i can be
expressed as
V˜i(ω, φ) =
[
cosω
ejφ sinω
]
, (52)
which fully describes the complex Grassmannian manifold
G2,1 by setting 0 ≤ φ ≤ 2pi and 0 ≤ ω ≤ pi/2. Let (ωˆ, φˆ)
be spherical coordinates parameterizing the unit sphere S2,
where 0 ≤ φˆ ≤ 2pi and 0 ≤ ωˆ ≤ pi. In [13, Lemma 1], the
authors further show that the map
S2 → G2,1
(ωˆ, φˆ) 7−→ V˜i(ωˆ/2, φˆ) (53)
is an isomorphism. In other words, the sampling problem on
G2,1 can analogically be addressed on the real sphere S2.
The method of sampling points uniformly from S2 is
provided in [22]. In details, one can parameterize (x, y, z) ∈ S2
using spherical coordinates (ωˆ, φˆ):
x = sin ωˆ cos φˆ,
y = sin ωˆ sin φˆ,
z = cos ωˆ. (54)
The area element of S2 is given by
dS = sin ωˆ d ωˆ d φˆ = − d (cos ωˆ) d φˆ. (55)
Hence, to obtain a uniform distribution over S2, one has to
pick φˆ ∈ [0, 2pi] and t ∈ [−1, 1] uniformly and compute ωˆ by:
ωˆ = arccos t. (56)
In this way cos ωˆ = t will be uniformly distributed in [−1, 1].
Based on above analysis, we give a straightforward method
for codebook construction:
Vˆ =
{
Vˆ1,i =
[
cos(0.5 arccos ti)
ejφi sin(0.5 arccos ti)
]∣∣∣∣∣ i = 1, ..., 2B
}
, (57)
where
ti = −1 +
2
⌈
i/2⌈B/2⌉
⌉
− 1
2⌊B/2⌋
, (58)
φi =
2pi
(
imod 2⌈B/2⌉
)
2⌈B/2⌉
. (59)
Note that ⌊x⌋ rounds to the closest integer smaller than or equal
to x, while ⌈x⌉ to the closest integer larger than or equal to x.
Using the deterministic codebook in (57) can save storage
space on Alice, since she can generate the target codeword
Vˆ1,j directly without the knowledge of the whole codebook
Vˆ. We remark that the proposed codebook construction is valid
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for any B. This is different from the construction scheme in
[13, Sec. VI-A], which is only possible for the case of B ≤ 4.
Example 4: Fig. 4 examines the performance of the pro-
posed codebook construction with β = 2, γ = 1, P = 10,
and NE = 1. When B ≤ 4, it is seen that the performance
of codebook Vˆ in (57) is indistinguishable from the optimal
one in [13, Sec. VI-A]. When B ≥ 8, the proposed codebook
provides the same performance as the random one in (8).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have discussed the problem of guaran-
teeing positive secrecy capacity for MIMOME channel with
the quantized CSI of Bob’s channel and the statistics of
Eve’s channel. We analyzed the RVQ-based AN scheme and
provided a lower bound on the ergodic secrecy capacity. We
proved that a positive secrecy capacity is always achievable
by Gaussian input alphabets when NE ≤ NA − NB, and the
number of feedback bits B and the artificial noise power Pv are
large enough. We also proposed an efficient implementation
of discretizing the RVQ codebook which exhibits similar
performance to that of random codebook.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
According to [12], as B → ∞, the RVQ operation in (9)
can guarantee
V˜j → V˜. (60)
We then check the matrix Zˆ generated by Alice. The SVD
decomposition of H can be written as
H = UΛV˜H . (61)
From (60) and (61), as B →∞, we have
HZˆ = UΛV˜H Zˆ→ UΛV˜Hj Zˆ = 0NA×(NA−NB), (62)
which means
Zˆ→ null(H). (63)
From (11), (60) and (63), we have Vˆ→ V as B →∞. 
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Using [19, Eq. 12, pp. 55], we have
∣∣∣INB + αγ(HV˜j)(HV˜j)H + αβγ(HZˆ)(HZˆ)H ∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣INB + θmin(HV˜j)(HV˜j)H + θmin(HZˆ)(HZˆ)H ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣INB + θminHHH ∣∣∣ , (64)
where θmin = min {αγ, αβγ}.
Since the unitary matrix Vˆ = [V˜j , Zˆ] is independent of
G and its realization is known to Alice, GV˜j ∈ CNE×NB
and GZˆ ∈ CNE×(NA−NB) are mutually independent complex
Gaussian random matrices with i.i.d. entries [23, Th. 1]. We
can write
E

log
∣∣∣INE + α(GV˜j)(GV˜j)H + αβ(GZˆ)(GZˆ)H ∣∣∣∣∣∣INE + αβ(GZˆ)(GZˆ)H ∣∣∣

 (65)
as the average of a function of NE×NA i.i.d complex Gaussian
random variables ∼ NC(0, 1).
Similarly, with unlimited feedback, we have
E

log
∣∣∣INE + α(GV˜)(GV˜)H + αβ(GZ)(GZ)H ∣∣∣∣∣∣INE + αβ(GZ)(GZ)H ∣∣∣

 (66)
as the average of a function of NE×NA i.i.d complex Gaussian
random variables ∼ NC(0, 1).
From (65) and (66), we have
E

log
∣∣∣INE + α(GV˜j)(GV˜j)H + αβ(GZˆ)(GZˆ)H ∣∣∣∣∣∣INE + αβ(GZˆ)(GZˆ)H ∣∣∣


= E

log
∣∣∣INE + α(GV˜)(GV˜)H + αβ(GZ)(GZ)H ∣∣∣∣∣∣INE + αβ(GZ)(GZ)H ∣∣∣


.(67)
From (21), (22), (64) and (67), E(∆RS) can be upper
bounded by
E(∆RS) ≤ E
(
log
∣∣∣INB + αγHHH ∣∣∣)
− E
(
log
∣∣∣INB + θminHHH ∣∣∣)
+ E
(
log
∣∣∣INB + αβγ(HZˆ)(HZˆ)H∣∣∣) . (68)
We then estimate the third term in (68). Let λ1, ... , λNB be
the eigenvalues of HHH . We have
H
H
H = V˜ΛV˜
H
and Λ = diag ([λ1, ..., λNB ]) . (69)
Recalling the fact that for a Wishart matrix, its eigenvalues
and eigenvectors are independent. Therefore V˜ and Λ are
independent. This allows us to bound the third term in (68)
8by
EH
(
log
∣∣∣INB + αβγ(HZˆ)(HZˆ)H ∣∣∣)
(a)
= EH
(
log
∣∣∣INA−NB + αβγ(HZˆ)H(HZˆ)∣∣∣)
= EΛ
(
E
V˜
(
log
∣∣∣INA−NB + αβγZˆHV˜ΛV˜H Zˆ∣∣∣))
(b)
= EΛ
(
E
V˜
(
log
∣∣∣INB + αβγV˜H ZˆZˆHV˜Λ∣∣∣))
(c)
≤ EΛ
(
E
V˜
(
log
∣∣∣INB + αβγEV˜ (V˜H ZˆZˆHV˜)Λ
∣∣∣))
(d)
= EΛ

log
∣∣∣∣∣∣INB +
αβγD
(
NA, NB, 2
B
)
NB
Λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣


(e)
≤ EΛ

log
∣∣∣∣∣∣INB +
αβγη
(
NA, NB, 2
B
)
NB
Λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣

 , (70)
where (a) and (b) hold because |I+AB| = |I+BA|, (c)
follows from the concavity of log determinant function, (d)
follows from [24, Lemma 1] [1, Lemma 2], (e) holds because
of (37).
Applying the fact [20, Th. 1]
E
(
log
∣∣∣INB + ρHHH∣∣∣) = E(log |INB + ρΛ|) = Θ(NB, NA, ρ),
(71)
to (68) and (70), we can simply obtain (41). 
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Recalling the fact that ZZH = INA − V˜V˜
H
and ZˆZˆH =
INA − V˜jV˜
H
j . From (21) and (22), if NB = NE = 1, we can
write ∆RS as
∆RS = log
(
1 + αγHHH
)
− log
1 + αGGH + α(β − 1)(GZ)(GZ)H
1 + αβ(GZ)(GZ)H
− log
1 + αβγHHH + αγ (1− β) (HV˜j)(HV˜j)
H
1 + αβγHHH − αβγ(HV˜j)(HV˜j)H
+ log
1 + αGGH + α(β − 1)(GZˆ)(GZˆ)
H
1 + αβ(GZˆ)(GZˆ)
H
. (72)
As NA and B →∞ with B/NA → B¯, according to [12, Th.
1], we have
(HV˜j)(HV˜j)
H
HHH
a.s.
→ (1− 2−B¯). (73)
Since β (AN power allocation), γ (Eve-to-Bob noise-power
ratio), and P = αγ + αβγ(NA − 1) (average transmit power
constraint) are fixed, the central limit theorem tells us that
αγHHH
a.s.
→ P/β, αGGH
a.s.
→ P/βγ,
α(GZ)(GZ)H
a.s.
→ P/βγ, α(GZˆ)(GZˆ)
H a.s.
→ P/βγ. (74)
Note that GZ (or GZˆ) is a complex Gaussian random vector
with i.i.d. entries [23, Th. 1].
By substituting (73) and (74) into (72), we obtain (44). 
D. Proof of Theorem 4
According to [17, Th. 1], we have
E(RS) = Θ(NB, NA, αγ) + Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ)− Ω, (75)
where Θ(·, ·, ·) is given in (30) and Ω is given in (47). By
substituting (41) and (75) into (29), we can obtain (46). 
E. Proof of Theorem 5
If β ≥ 1, then θmin = αγ. From (46) and (75), as B →∞,
C¯LB,Q = Θ(NB, NA, αγ) + Θ(Nmin, Nmax, αβ)− Ω = E(RS).
(76)
According to [17, Th. 3], if NE ≤ NA −NB, as αβ →∞,
E(RS) = E(CS) = C¯Bob, (77)
where C¯Bob represents Bob’s average channel capacity.
Meanwhile, it always holds that
C¯LB,Q ≤ E(CS,Q) ≤ C¯Bob. (78)
From (76), (77) and (78), if NE ≤ NA −NB and β ≥ 1, as
αβ, B →∞, we have
C¯LB,Q = E(CS,Q) = E(CS) = C¯Bob. (79)

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